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RICHARD RAWLINGS* 
The UK continues to undergo a rapid process of constitutional change, with an 
ongoing redistribution of law-making and governmental powers to different parts of 
the Union under an expanded rubric of 'devolution'. The paper illuminates a 
pervasive sense of territorial constitutional crisis and opportunity in the most recent 
period, familiarly associated with, but not confined to, Scotland. Constructive and 
flexible federal-type responses inside a famously uncodified constitution are 
championed. Wales, commonly treated as a junior partner in the UK, presents special 
challenges for constitutional and legal analysis and distinctive perspectives on the 
Union which have not received the attention they deserve. In tackling this deficiency, 
the paper elaborates a ‘new Union’ concept of a looser and less hierarchical set of 
constitutional arrangements in which several systems of parliamentary government 
are grounded in popular sovereignty and co-operate for mutual benefit.  
 
TIME TRIP 
The music of ‘Riders on the Storm’ takes us back over forty years, to in British public life the 
Royal Commission on the Constitution (‘Kilbrandon’).1 The Commission had been 
established in the light of an early surge of nationalist sentiment in Scotland and Wales, as 
well as generalised complaint of too much centralisation in London. ‘There was obviously’, 
the Report solemnly intoned, ‘some discontent with the workings of government’.2 Even 
though it largely sidestepped the Northern Ireland conflict, the Commission had a hard time. 
The instructions were vague, the inquiry seemingly endless, and, as shown in a 
comprehensive memorandum of dissent, the members fell out. The main question of 
devolution of powers from central government saw various schemes analysed for different 
parts of the UK and then disagreed about. And of course another generation would pass, and 
a certain Margaret Thatcher come and go, before Tony Blair’s fresh-faced New Labour 
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1 Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969-1973, Vol. 1, Report (1973, Cmnd. 5460) (the Kilbrandon 
Commission). Recorded by Jim Morrison and the Doors in 1970, ‘Riders on the Storm’ features on the album L. 
A. Woman. 
2 id., para. 1. 
government introduced devolution statutes for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (again) 
at the turn of the century.3 
1. Legacy issues 
Nonetheless, looking at the ‘Union’ through contemporary eyes as the UK’s voluntary 
association of four home countries,4 the legacy of Kilbrandon should not be discounted. 
Providing at one and the same time a mine of historical information and analysis, a source of 
constitutional inspiration, and a political and bureaucratic cautionary tale, the Commission’s 
Report remains the last serious attempt by official sources to grapple with the overarching 
territorial architecture of this democratic multi- (pluri-) national state5 in a joined-up way. 
Particularly striking from the comparative standpoint is the firm rejection of ‘federalism’ as a 
possible solution for the UK’s apparent constitutional woes. ‘Few of our witnesses advocated 
it, and people who know the system well tend to advise against it’.6 A slightly surprising 
conclusion, one might think, given that the rise of the Dominions and retreat from Empire 
had seen Britain conjuring federalism for many other peoples. For the avoidance of doubt, in 
rendering the federal idea in the UK dormant for several decades, Kilbrandon applied the 
strict conception of a full, formal ‘federal system’: ‘sovereignty … divided between two 
levels of government … a written constitution … basic terms … “entrenched”’.7  
The Commission emphasised two objections which continue to resonate in this Atlantic 
archipelago.8 First (and ahead of much growth in judicial review), excessive legalism, or as 
might now be said, too much power for the UK Supreme Court. Second, ‘the dominance of 
England’ as currently constituted by some 85% of the UK population; and, in particular, the 
likely problems of governability or stand-offs with the UK Parliament if an English 
Parliament was created. Although typical of the time Kilbrandon had little to say about 
notions of English identity or nationhood,9 the Report also evidenced distaste for ‘artificial 
division’ into English regional assemblies.10 It prefigures a failure of New Labour proposals 
along these lines, with the notable exception of a directly elected Mayor and Assembly for 
Greater London.11 
Kilbrandon established a small reservoir of general principles for reform of the territorial 
constitution, as conceived in terms of the distribution of powers and resources across the four 
home countries, and the relations between them, inside the UK. Perhaps the better adjective is 
‘re-established’ since it does not do to overlook the historical legacy of all those debates on 
home rule in Victorian times12 and later.13 Kilbrandon spoke of ‘the need to preserve unity’, 
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11 Greater London Authority Act 1999; and see T. Travers, The Politics of London: Governing an ungovernable 
city (2004).  
12 Ireland always, but extending to a dash of Cymru Fydd (‘New Wales’); see K. Morgan, Revolution to 
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coupled with desirable ‘flexibility’ and ‘good communication between government and 
people’. The Report duly integrated a key element of legitimacy – ‘constitutional 
arrangements cannot be imposed against the will of the people’ – and constitutional 
fundamentals such as preserving and fostering representative democracy and (as it would 
then have been put) ‘the greatest regard for the liberty of the individual.’14 To anticipate the 
argument, it would have been strange indeed if this appeal to constitutional theory and 
practice from a Royal Commission had gone unremarked in present-day debates over the 
Union.  
The development of Welsh devolution also highlights a particular role for institutional 
memory in the shadow of Kilbrandon. Closed and elite forms of constitution-building later 
revealed, this is the story of how, pressed to give evidence, dominant forces in the Labour 
Party adopted the model of executive (not legislative) devolution and then, despite the 
inconvenient fact of minimal support for it on the Commission, clung to this approach in the 
ill-fated Wales Act 1978 and subsequent long years of Conservative government.15 Why 
reinvent the wheel? Carefully preserved in the bowels of the territorial department, official 
papers from the 1970s would duly be recycled – samizdat fashion – as John Major’s 
administration tottered to destruction at the hands of New Labour.16 
2. Crisis and opportunity 
Self-evidently, the great wave of devolution launched by New Labour has not served to 
stabilise the internal constitutional architecture of the UK. To speak today of a pervasive 
sense of territorial constitutional crisis, let alone of constitutional unsettlement,17 or (in the 
words of the Oxford dictionary definition) of ‘a time of intense difficulty or danger’ for the 
Union, hardly exaggerates. The twin political facts that in the Scottish independence 
referendum18 some 45% voted to leave, and that an avowedly nationalist/separatist party has 
won victories in a UK general election on a scale not seen since Sinn Fein in 1918, cannot be 
wished away.  
 
Harking back to the song-title, this ongoing political and constitutional storm, centred at least 
for the time being over Scotland, affords many opportunities. Not just for those who in 
properly democratic fashion promote the cause of independence, but also for reform of the 
UK’s territorial constitution in terms of, in federal-style language,19 both ‘shared rule’ and 
‘self-rule’. Again, while driven to venture the elements, some parts are obviously less well-
placed than others to make the political and constitutional weather. In such conditions free-
riding goes some way but only so far. As will be seen, Wales, commonly treated as a junior 
partner in the UK, exemplifies this aspect.  
 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL JOURNEY 
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15 R. Scully and R. Wyn Jones, Wales Says Yes: Devolution and the 2011 Welsh Referendum (2012) ch. 2. 
16 R. Rawlings, Delineating Wales (2003) ch. 2. 
17 V. Bogdanor, The crisis of the Constitution (2015); N. Walker, ‘Our Constitutional Unsettlement’ (2014) 
Public Law 529. 
18 See T. Mullen, ‘The Scottish Independence Referendum 2014’ (2015) 41 J. of Law and Society 627; and 
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19 D. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (1987); M. Burgess, In Search of the Federal Spirit (2012).  
1. Shifting gears 
 
What an extraordinary constitutional journey it has been for what I originally called in the 
pages of this journal ‘The New Model Wales’.20 Triggered narrowly by referendum and 
inaugurated under the Government of Wales Act 1998, the first - executive - phase of Welsh 
devolution gave birth to a recognisably national polity. But offending the principle of 
separation of powers, representative and governmental functions were combined in the new 
National Assembly for Wales, which was itself limited to patchy secondary law-making 
powers based on previous territorial department functions. Developed via Part III of the 
Government of Wales Act 2006, a second – proto-legislative – phase established a 
mainstream structure of parliamentary government. Although more substantial powers were 
given to make or modify legislative provision, such ‘Assembly Measures’ were strictly 
confined to designated policy fields, as supplemented through a convoluted process of 
legislative competence orders. Activated under Part IV of the 2006 Act by convincing 
majority in another referendum, a third – fully legislative – phase continues with an intricate 
model of conferred powers: ‘Acts of the Assembly’ must sufficiently relate to subjects listed 
in the statute. While enabling primary law-making by the National Assembly, this model has 
proved a recipe for litigation at UK Supreme Court level.21 The Wales Act 2014 has also 
broken new ground in the fiscal constitution by establishing some Welsh taxing powers.22  
 
Successive bouts of public criticism, followed by review and recommendation by 
independent Commission - Richard,23 Jones Parry,24 Holtham,25 Silk 1 and 226- underwrite 
the increasingly tired mantra that ‘devolution is a process not an event’. At the heart of this 
ongoing constitutional debate in Wales have been concerns about coherence and clarity,27 
effective policy delivery, and stability, subsidiarity and responsibility. The scale of the Welsh 
home-grown – autochthonous – development should not be overlooked, however. Future 
historians will surely remark on a whole series of domestic building blocks, for example 
major internal reform of organisational structures or innovative provision on sustainable 
development, equality and bilingualism. This aspect deserves special emphasis in view of a 
surrounding territorial constitutional turmoil which has, after all, been brewing for quite some 
time. To adapt a well-known local aphorism,28 Wales is an artefact which the Welsh partially 
produce; if they want to.  
 
Published in 2003, my original monograph on Welsh devolution examined the early 
processes of establishing legal and political responsibilities, the creation of often skeletal 
institutional forms, the new relations with local government and public agencies, and the 
beginnings of post-devolution networks in civil society, under the title ‘Delineating Wales’.29 
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With benchmarks thus to hand, it will soon be time properly to evaluate the internal 
maturation of the Welsh polity across the different phases under the fuller rubric of 
‘Constituting Wales’. A looming redesign of electoral arrangements for the National 
Assembly will be an exemplar,30 with issues of capacity/effectiveness and inclusiveness/ 
equitable treatment requiring careful assessment in terms of political responsibility and 
accountability. Wales in my view has an increasingly good story to tell; which is not to 
overlook major challenges as with economic development31 and public service delivery.32 Let 
us hope that new work on the interplay of constitution, values, politics and practice will be of 
interest not least to the many practitioners participating in a truly historic process for Wales 
perhaps without realising it.  
2. Wide horizons  
 
Let me refer to the ‘UK’s Changing Union’ research project, based in Wales. Running for 
three years from 2012, the project has served to enrich our understanding of territorial 
politics, not least through partnership-working in England,33 and made an important series of 
targeted interventions in the Welsh devolutionary process.34 In light of the ferment in the 
UK’s territorial constitution the fact of the project underwrites two different but related 
themes: the need for more considered responses than those hitherto on offer from the UK 
government, and the insufficiently well-known fact of Wales as a small but significant 
crucible of innovative constitutional thinking about the Union.  
 
Putting this in perspective, fifteen years of experience with devolution have hardly served to 
blunt the familiar criticism of UK constitutional development as ad hoc and piecemeal: in 
light of a rapid, varied and ongoing redistribution of law-making and governmental powers to 
different parts of the Union, quite the reverse. The House of Lords Constitution Committee 
has castigated the unionist parties at Westminster for no coherent vision for the future shape 
of the UK and has expressed astonishment, no less, at the seeming failure of central 
government in Whitehall to think through the wider implications of further powers for 
Scotland.35 There is today a whole cottage industry of unofficial responses to territorial 
constitutional crisis - all those think tanks and lobby groups aiming to act as agents of change 
and settlement. Conditions in Wales have also been ripe, however, for a more considered 
approach in official circles to the design and workings of the UK’s territorial constitution. It 
is not simply that in the last few years Wales has had the only devolved government wholly 
committed to the Union. For this junior member of the UK ‘family’ of countries, muddling 
through the territorial constitution commonly has negative connotations; more exchanges 
between Westminster and Holyrood, less, in the title of the original devolution White Paper,36 
‘a voice for Wales’.  
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First Minister of Wales Carwyn Jones has spoken of a ‘new Union’ mind-set, at heart the 
concept of a looser and less hierarchical set of constitutional arrangements in which several 
systems of parliamentary government are grounded in popular sovereignty and co-operate for 
mutual benefit.37 In contrast, that is, to a devolution mind-set or the assumption that the UK is 
fundamentally a centralised state.38 Viewed in comparative perspective, this is the realm of 
‘asymmetrical quasi-federalism’, an ugly phrase which serves nonetheless to combine two 
creative elements of constitutional theory. On the one hand, the scope with distributed 
authority for territorial variation around a strong common core in the light of particular 
historic, economic and demographic factors; an aspect which has special resonance in Wales 
in view of the long dynamic of close integration with England.39 On the other hand, moving 
beyond the strict conception of federalism discountenanced by Kilbrandon, the broader reach 
of federal-type ideas of shared rule and self-rule in a flexible system of multi-level 
governance, where the First Minister has identified enabling unity while guaranteeing 
diversity as ‘exactly the challenge we face’.40 Future historians will no doubt wish to reflect 
on how these high level statements have played out in the Welsh government’s evolving 
constitutional policy, as elaborated before the various independent Commissions, in the 
National Assembly, and to Westminster committees. Some may even be a little critical of this 
particular brand of new Union thinking for insufficient attention to localism within each 
nation, the evident potential of city regions,41 and, more broadly, the virtues of ‘double 
devolution’ (to and inside the country). 
Several positive aspects of the new Union concept deserve special emphasis. In terms of the 
general direction of travel, the approach underscores the growth of federal-type elements in 
the UK constitution, epitomised today in moves statutorily to recognise the Scottish and 
Welsh devolved institutions as permanent features on the constitutional landscape.42 
Secondly, mutual respect between the different legislatures inside the UK is a cardinal 
principle. While the routine workings of Dicey’s doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty may 
suffice in England, Westminster, unless with the explicit assent of the devolved legislature 
and on a suitably generous reading of the well-known Sewel convention,43 should not 
normally legislate with regard to devolved matters or competence. Splendidly envisioned, 
this involves the abandonment of Anglo-centric and Metropolitan practices of what I have 
elsewhere called ‘constitutional patriarchy’.44 Thirdly, a holistic view of the character and 
purposes of the Union is of the essence of this approach. Drawing for example on the 
admirably accessible analysis of the 2009 Calman report on Scottish devolution,45 attention is 
here drawn to the triple alliance of ‘political union’, as with representation of all parts at the 
centre; ‘economic union’, as with an integrated market underpinned by a single currency and 
central fiscal framework; and ‘social union’, as with a safety net of welfare benefits; to which 
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must of course be added ‘security and defence union’. As one would expect from a Welsh 
Labour leader, the First Minister has placed particular stress on social solidarity and hence 
the need to preserve basic welfare entitlements as a core component of common citizenship.46  
 
An alternative vision of a reformed Union has been sketched by Deputy Presiding Officer and 
Conservative Member of the National Assembly David Melding.47 The working assumption 
is that without a firm constitutional settlement, as in the form of a new Act of Union, 
unionism is destined to fail. Solid Burkean conservatism in terms of no clean break in the 
constitutional development, Melding propounds the idea of a federation deeply infused with 
(something called) the British parliamentary tradition.48 Read however in the particular 
context of Wales, this form of institutional imagining is perhaps more radical than at first 
appears; not so much historical patterns of assimilation with England, as flashes of a new 
Conservative brand of Welsh unionism. As part of a rich vein of federal-type ideas 
(re)surfacing in the Union’s current predicament,49 Melding’s contribution heralds efforts at 
legal consolidation and judicialisation. 
One point on which our protagonists have agreed is the importance of constitutional timing 
and process. From 2012 on, the First Minister repeatedly called for a constitutional 
convention jointly sponsored by all four governments in the UK: in part to allow public 
participation; but in particular to facilitate joined-up thinking on the territorial constitution, 
rather than conversations in different rooms or bilateral reforms to particular constitutional 
arrangements; and further, of course, to ensure a seat for Wales at the table. This was coupled 
with clear warnings to the then Cameron-Clegg government: be proactive or risk being 
dictated to by events in Scotland.50 Nor could the Deputy Presiding Officer fairly be accused 
of constitutional shyness when messaging his Conservative colleagues in coalition in London. 
Such was the rhetoric, in hammering home the need for a constitutional convention, of the 
Union only surviving with a quick rewrite of the constitutional rulebook.51 These local 
soothsayers were fated to go unheeded in Whitehall, however, in the critical period ahead of 
the Scottish independence referendum. Such, it may be said, is the condition of Wales.  
 
THUNDER AND LIGHTNING 
The Cameron-Clegg administration, I recently wrote,52 will go down in history as the 
government which almost lost the Union. Permitted under the terms of the Edinburgh 
Agreement,53 a fine example of popular (Scottish) sovereignty had brought a complacent and 
then panicked Westminster elite virtually to its knees. If not the end, then strange days when, 
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Q. Rev. 215. 
at the thunderous height of an energising referendum campaign, the leaders of the main 
unionist parties vow major constitutional reform – ‘devo more’ or ‘faster, safer and better 
change’ for Scotland - in the Daily Record.54 Among many noises off, the Smith Commission 
was conjured into existence, tasked with making recommendations for further devolution of 
powers to the Scottish Parliament.55 As a constitutional moment,56 September 2014 and all its 
works takes some beating. 
Future historians will no doubt be busy tracing the changes in the constitutional weather, not 
least at the heart of the British political establishment in Westminster. Commonly whirring 
away in the background, the select committee system is a useful barometer. On from 
occasional forays in the territorial constitution,57 another cottage industry of reports would 
rapidly develop: oh-so belatedly. Predictably the product would be very variable: ranging 
from all those suitably august deliberations in the House of Lords to the last gasp efforts of a 
Labour-dominated Scottish Affairs Committee,58 and on through to a determinedly optimistic 
vision of fiscal devolution in England.59 Not forgetting lumbering efforts at a draft written 
constitution, for which purpose, on an 800th anniversary, the hallowed name ‘Magna Carta’ 
was naturally invoked.60 Paper was here being piled on paper.  
The work of the Smith Commission and, underwriting the huge political stakes, an almost 
mechanical rendition of their proposals item by item in a Command Paper most hopefully 
titled Scotland in the United Kingdom: An enduring settlement,61 naturally commands 
attention. The process is an exemplar, on the one hand, of cross-party discussions with an 
independent chairman and tight timetable, hence scarce public involvement, many rough 
edges, but a deal nonetheless; and, on the other, of what has so concerned the Welsh First 
Minister, hence discrete territorial focus and likely knock-on effects for the rest of the UK. 
Then again certain recommendations, for example on the devolved legislature having 
competence over its own electoral arrangements, with the safeguard of super-majority 
decision-making,62 could happily be read across. 
The Prime Minister’s immediate and very public linking of more powers for Scotland with 
something called ‘a fair settlement’ for England will also linger long in constitutional 
memory.63 For the rigidly devout unionist, EVEL - ‘English votes for English laws’ - should 
be anathema, but, in terms of political representation at the centre, this it seems is a 
constitutionally more secular age. Illuminating a strong sense of dissatisfaction with how 
England is currently governed, the leading attitudinal survey suggests considerable public 
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63 David Cameron, speech outside 10 Downing Street, 19 September 2014.  
support for this type of approach.64 With few (or no) MPs from the other three (Celtic) lands, 
and faced by the populist challenge of the UK Independence Party, it was only too tempting 
for the Conservatives to opt for stronger veto powers for English MPs on so-called English 
legislation than the independent McKay Commission had recommended.65 Jumping forward 
to the fact of a Conservative majority government, another source of friction in the struggle 
over the Union is identified; the SNP, after all, unlike Sinn Fein, has not adopted a general 
policy of abstentionism in the House of Commons.66 In areas such as policing and criminal 
justice, English and Welsh MPs would also be counted together by reason of the historic 
functional motif in central government of ‘England and Wales’, but probably with 
significantly less representation from Wales by reason of a review of UK constituency 
boundaries.67 Political contingency again: might this not serve in the medium term to 
underwrite the case for devolution to Wales in those areas?68   
 
HEAVY GOING 
A substantial devolution case-law had already emerged ahead of the Scottish independence 
referendum; at first largely Scottish in origin and driven by private parties,69 but with a dash 
of the Northern Irish,70 and latterly from Wales in inter-governmental litigation linked to the 
intricacies of the conferred powers model.71 Many of the cases involve the doubled protection 
of human rights with devolution, whereby, alongside the general operation of the Human 
Rights Act 1998, the Convention rights are part and parcel of the statutory – written – 
constitutions of the three Celtic lands.72 Even discounting for the importance of context, 
however, the jurisprudence is characterised by a variety of approaches. Whereas some judges 
downplay the constitutional significance of devolution, hence envisaging strict constraints on 
the young representative institutions, other judges promote the idea of a new and generous 
constitutional dispensation, while other judges again pursue a more or less middling path. A 
jurisprudence which the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law suggests ‘has not been entirely 
consistent’73 is in my view more like a morass. 
Originally argued in May 2014, but with the decision only handed down in February 2015, 
the Asbestos Diseases case74 showcases – if that is the right word – serious judicial 
disagreement. An innovative Welsh scheme for the recovery from employers/insurers of NHS 
treatment costs was effectively trumped by powerful commercial interests, so frustrating a 
redistributive measure passed by a democratically elected legislature under the banner of 
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social justice.  Referred by the Counsel General for Wales to the UK Supreme Court, with a 
view to avoiding the uncertainty and expense otherwise associated with private legal action, a 
friendly in-house challenge had thus taken on a different flavour through third party 
intervention. Naturally a sore point in Cardiff Bay, the judges not only ruled unanimously 
against the National Assembly’s bill on a narrow ground of retrospectivity, but also divided 
3-2 against the legislature on the chief issues of vires in the sense of conferred power and 
compatibility with the fundamental - Convention - right to peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions.75  
The two different approaches adopted in Asbestos Diseases to the compatibility issue, or 
more precisely the question of the proportionality or otherwise of the National Assembly’s 
intervention under the rubric of public interest, and hence of the degree of deference or 
respect or weight given by the judges to the exercise of legislative choice, go directly to the 
constitutional status of the several parliaments and assemblies inside the UK. Elaborated in 
the minority judgment of Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and there combined with a strong 
defence of democratic legislative space, one approach is determinedly non-hierarchical in 
character. Alongside contextual sensitivity to the matter in issue, this is the stuff of each 
Parliament or Assembly being ‘entitled to form its own judgement about public interest … no 
logical justification for treating the views of one such body in a different way to the others … 
great weight … attached to the legislative choice made by the Welsh Assembly’.76 Reverting 
to the fact of Wales as a crucible of innovative constitutional thinking, this fits nicely with the 
First Minister’s espousal of a new Union mind-set: greater parity of esteem across the several 
democratically legitimated centres of authority inside the UK.  
Coupled with the according of ‘weight’ – not ‘great weight’ - to the National Assembly’s 
legislative choice, the other approach appears in the majority judgment of Lord Mance. 
Referencing Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 (parliamentary privilege and all that), Lord 
Mance suggests ‘a relevant distinction between cases concerning primary legislation by the 
United Kingdom Parliament and other legislative and executive decisions’. For which read, 
cutting to the chase, greater judicial respect for legislation affecting England and little 
differentiation between the devolved legislatures and other public bodies such as local 
authorities.77 Going directly against the constitutional direction of travel, not least in 
Scotland, this is a backward-looking approach in more ways than one. As such, I think it 
constitutional myopic and - yes - unionist folly.  
 
 
LOCAL TRAFFIC 
In his foreword to the Command Paper Powers for a Purpose: Towards a lasting devolution 
settlement for Wales, published in February 2015, the Secretary of State Stephen Crabb was 
suitably forthright: ‘it is in the best interests of the people of Wales’ that we have a clear 
devolution settlement which gives them a stronger voice over their own affairs within a 
strong and successful United Kingdom.’78 Begun just four months earlier with a deadline of 
the Welsh festivities on March 1st, the cross-party ‘St David’s Day process’ led by the 
minister had produced consensus on a list of statutory reforms.  
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It does not do to gloss over the differences with the Smith Commission process. The political 
parties were working first and foremost inside the parameters of the recommendations for 
further legislative powers made by the independent Silk Commission.79 In turn, far from 
constructing heads of agreement as did the Smith Commission, they engaged in multiple 
cherry-picking, with consensus, or veto, or no time to discuss, box-ticked in the Command 
Paper.80 The Welsh process was even more closeted than the Scottish one. Unlike the Smith 
Commission, there were no appointed members, no website, and no published evidence from 
the political parties (or anyone else). Yes, the Silk Commission had done all this previously; 
but, in an ever more febrile atmosphere ahead of the UK general election, who now was 
blocking what, and why? Lacking in the good governance values of transparency, 
inclusiveness and accountability of which so much has been heard with devolution,81 the St 
David’s Day process was never likely to produce a lasting settlement for Wales; nor has it.  
1. Fuelling 
 
As regards the fiscal constitution, the usual suspects in Welsh devolution of ‘step-by-step’ 
and ‘read across’ (from Scotland) are clearly in evidence. But also lurking in the shadows is a 
devolutionary dynamic which typically goes unremarked, but which could in time have 
particular relevance for Wales: namely, that some have powers thrust upon them.  
 
Following in the footsteps of the Scotland Act 2012, the Wales Act 2014 set in train a process 
whereby the National Assembly has responsibility for 10% of all taxes collected in Wales and 
– subject as the legislation currently stands to a referendum82 – for some income tax powers. 
Block grant from the Treasury, however, is still determined via the well-known Barnett 
formula, an approach which has clearly operated to Wales’ disadvantage.83  Inclusion of the 
formula in the ‘vow’ to the people of Scotland represents bilateral, back-of-the-envelope, and 
lop-sided policy-making, to a tee. The St David’s Day process has the UK government 
agreeing to introduce a funding ‘floor’, so regulating the Barnett-style convergence of 
Treasury funding per head in Wales to the lower average for England, in ‘the expectation’84 
that the Welsh government will call a referendum on income tax powers by 2020. But with 
the Command Paper also explaining that the precise level of the ‘floor’, and the mechanism 
to deliver it, will only be agreed alongside the next UK Spending Review,85 the First Minister 
has been notably cautious about more fiscal powers for the National Assembly.86  
 
Putting this in broader constitutional perspective, a clear framework of relative needs 
assessment grounded in objective indicators is today nothing less than an article of faith in 
the Welsh polity.87 Good governance values of transparency and legitimacy point firmly in 
this direction. Indeed, with a view to establishing properly independent institutional 
machinery, HM Treasury might usefully reflect, not only on comparable arrangements in the 
Commonwealth,88 but also valuable precedents at home such as the Bank of England’s 
                                                          
79 Silk 2, op. cit., n 26. 
80 HM Government, op. cit., n. 62, Annex A. 
81 From the very early years: see for example, P. Chaney, New Governance – New Democracy? (2001); also, 
Women, Politics and Constitutional Change, eds. P. Chaney et al (2007). 
82 Wales Act 2014, ss. 12-14. 
83 Holtham, op. cit., n. 25. 
84 HM Government, op. cit., n. 62, para. 4.10. 
85 id., para. 4.9. 
86 Jones, op. cit., n. 37. 
87Holtham, op. cit., n. 25. 
88 See for example, Bingham Centre, op. cit., n.  73, ch. 6.  
Monetary Policy Committee and the Office for Budget Responsibility.89 And the more so, it 
may be said, given the many complications associated with the UK government’s fiscal 
proposals for Scotland,90 as well as the clear constitutional merits of devolved fiscal powers 
in terms of fuelling local policy instruments and lines of democratic accountability.91  
 
2. Higher gear(s)?  
 
Wales is currently embarking on a fourth – revamped legislative – phase, with the move to a 
reserved powers model being virtually a given in the St David’s Day process. I have long 
advocated this type of arrangement for the kinds of reasons articulated in the 2014 Report 
from the (Silk) Commission on Devolution in Wales:92 namely, the linked potentials of 
greater clarity and consistency, subsidiarity or enhanced policy space in Cardiff Bay, and 
sharper lines of political accountability. In an evidently doomed attempt to avoid all the 
frustrations of phases two and three of the Welsh devolutionary journey, I set out a scheme in 
evidence to the Richard Commission in 2003; naturally, this was closely informed by the 
model of reserved powers established in the Scotland Act 1998.93 A key theme of my 
evidence was that model and powers go together; the evident advantages of the one being 
largely dependent in practice on the scale and design of the other. In particular, I said, the 
wider the range of powers, and the more broadly they are drawn, the less likely that 
constitutionally enervating legal disputes will arise. And, for good measure, that a cleaner and 
more generous cut – a constitutional design premised on reducing the legislative grit in the 
political and administrative system – should appeal to the happy Welsh unionist.94  
 
At the heart of day-to-day issues of legislative competence is what I call the connector term; 
to be precise, the statutory formula ‘relates to’. As the shared talisman of different models of 
devolution the connector works in opposite ways, so referencing, on the one hand, the 
requirement with conferred powers to find relevant statutory pegs on which to hang 
policies;95 and, on the other, the need with reserved powers to avoid a whole set of legislative 
hooks.96 The reverse dynamics become even clearer if one imagines an alternative connector 
term: ‘falls within’. From the standpoint of the Welsh government, this would be very 
restrictive with a conferred powers model, but conversely highly liberating with a reserved 
powers model, which in parentheses is why it is most unlikely to happen. 
The burgeoning devolution case-law must be factored into the equation. From the standpoint 
of the Welsh government, the Supreme Court ruling in the Agricultural Sector case that 
National Assembly legislation, where it also relates to a subject on which the conferred 
powers model is silent, is within powers if it ‘fairly and realistically’ relates to a subject of 
devolved competence,97 was, dare one say it, a green light. Serving to point-up the potential 
with the move to reserved powers for a roll-back of devolved competence, a different spin is 
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detected at Westminster, namely that the judgment ‘made it clear the current model might 
confer considerably wider powers than the UK government had intended in the 2006 Act’.98  
As an exercise in narrow interpretation, the majority judgment on devolved competence in 
the Asbestos Diseases case sends the message ‘proceed with caution’. Lord Mance was 
following precedent99 with the reading of ‘relates to’ as demanding ‘more than a loose or 
consequential connection’.100 But in working with this in formulaic and private law fashion to 
read down the statutory language of devolved competence in the 2006 Act, his judgment 
underscores the strict constraints of the conferred powers model.101  
Constructing a reserved powers model for a small polity long dependent on, and socially and 
economically integrated with, its larger English neighbour, was always going to be very 
challenging; and the more so, in view of the constitutionally unique and ever more awkward 
situation of two legislatures (Cardiff Bay and Westminster) and one legal system (‘England 
and Wales’). Turning this round, the putative move to reserved powers may well, in the not 
so long view, herald a fifth – legal jurisdictional – phase of Welsh devolution.102  
The St David’s Day process has compounded the drafting problems. Such is the remorseless 
logic of a situation in which the Silk Commission sensibly combines the reserved powers 
approach with a substantial set of proposals for further devolution, not least in policing, 
prisons and  criminal justice,103 but then substantial parts of these are vetoed, in particular 
much of anything to do with the Home Office.104 The annexes to the Command Paper Powers 
for a Purpose are instructive. One provides an illustrative list showing the UK government’s 
original thinking on where reservations would be needed.105 Oddly, one might think, this 
proceeds on the basis, not of what was agreed under the St David’s Day process, but of the 
pre-existing arrangements under the conferred powers model. A good clue as to the 
thoroughgoing technical difficulty of the exercise, as well as - perish the thought - 
disagreement among Whitehall departments, emphasis is placed on the fact that ‘the list is not 
exhaustive, and reservations would also be needed in other areas’. Even so, the list speaks 
volumes: literally. For which read sprawling items such as ‘civil law and procedure’ and 
‘criminal law and procedure’, and also a paradigm field for multi-faceted policy development 
like ‘prevention of crime’.  
A second annex gives a page-long example of a set of reservations in road transport.106 Even 
this is deceptively simple, illustrating none of the exceptions, let alone ‘carve-outs’ from 
those exceptions, liable to mark National Assembly competence over particular aspects of 
different policy fields.  Grimly familiar in Wales from legislative competence orders,107 
elemental rule of law concerns about clarity and transparency in the constitutional order 
should not be glossed over. A third annex,108 which contains a checklist of matters for 
                                                          
98 House of Commons Library, Wales: Current devolution proposals 2014-15, Standard Note SN/PC/07066 
(2015) at 4.  
99 As first developed in Scottish cases: Martin v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 10, para. 49 (Lord Walker). 
100 Asbestos Diseases case, op. cit., n. 21, para 25. 
101 id., paras. 26-27. Conversely, Lord Mance passed over s. 154(2) of the Government of Wales Act 2006, 
which provides for reading down Assembly Acts in accordance with devolved competence where ‘possible’. 
102 See Silk 2, op. cit., n. 26, ch. 10. 
103 id.  
104HM Government, op. cit., n. 62, Annex A. 
105 id., Annex B. 
106 id., Annex C. 
107 See for example, House of Lords Constitution Committee, Twentieth Report, The Proposed National 
Assembly for Wales (Legislative Competence) (Environment) Order 2009, HL (2008-9)159. 
108 HM Government, op. cit., n. 62, Annex D. 
consideration when preparing a reserved powers model for Wales, is highly London-centric. 
While the pull of UK-wide policy delivery, to ensure that citizens have the same rights and 
obligations, is properly highlighted, nowhere is this matched with the devolutionary 
principles of subsidiarity, autonomy and diversity. In speaking of ‘silent subjects’ considered 
the sole responsibility of Westminster, the guidance also signals some legislative striking 
back109 at the judicial reasoning in the Agricultural Wages case.  
Looking forward, the move to a reserved powers model will demand rigorous scrutiny with a 
view to ensuring that the legislative scheme is suitably accessible, workable and generous. 
Following the precedent of the Wales Act 2014,110 such a process should involve Welsh 
ministers in seeking the National Assembly’s consent to the provisions modifying devolved 
legislative competence in the bill,111 and hence examination by the National Assembly’s 
Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee. This suggests a significant test of the 
internal maturation of the Welsh polity, especially in view of general elections to the 
devolved legislatures in May 2016. 
First Minister Carwyn Jones has made clear his serious misgivings, indicating that, if the 
reservation-making gets out of hand, the Welsh government might not advise the National 
Assembly to give legislative consent.112 Be this as it may, there is far to go if the new 
statutory framework is to measure up to the admirable sentiments of the Secretary of State in 
Powers for a Purpose, where he spoke of ‘the path to a clear, robust and lasting devolution 
settlement.’113 Indeed, in indicating a most picky approach to reserved powers, the Command 
Paper has raised the spectre of a strange constitutional vehicle: some short legislative parts 
concerning permanence and competence that flow from the St David’s Day process and/or 
the Smith Commission, followed by page after page after page of what the devolved 
institutions cannot do.114  ‘The Wales Act – a contradiction in terms’: the very idea should 
serve as a warning.  
 
SPEEDING ON 
1. Westminster climes 
Today, the Conservatives bear a heavy burden of responsibility by reason of the conduct as 
well as the outcome of the UK general election campaign. Repeatedly warning about the 
prospect of a Labour/SNP coalition was a perfectly legitimate campaign tactic; not least, it 
may be said, in view of the evident political skill of someone who – ironically – was not 
standing for election, Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon. Yet it was inevitably the case 
that, amid all the campaign rhetoric, ‘SNP’ would commonly be conflated with ‘Scotland’. 
One need not be po-faced to appreciate the dangers for the Union from competing 
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nationalisms when probably the best-known Conservative politician in the south-east of 
England raises the spectre of something called ‘Ajockalypse now’.115  
To the victor go the spoils. The predictable response from the leader of a majority 
Conservative government freshly contemplating years of power under the Fixed-term 
Parliaments Act 2011, David Cameron was very quick to rule out the possible froth of a 
constitutional convention, or what he caricatured as an ‘an enormous talking shop with every 
faddish idea under the sun’.116 Rather, as outlined in their 2015 election manifesto, the 
Conservatives would press on directly.117 Signalling a busy session at Westminster, the new 
government’s programme set out in the Queen’s Speech featured a great weight of 
constitutional legislation, heavily targeted on territorial architecture. A Scotland Bill 
implementing Smith Commission recommendations, which was duly trumpeted as making 
the Scottish Parliament ‘one of the most powerful devolved parliaments in the world’.118 A 
draft Wales Bill119 constructed in the wake of the St David’s Day process, which was 
sufficient to ground the expectation of a statute in the next parliamentary session. A Northern 
Ireland (Stormont House Agreement) Bill providing for a historical investigations unit in the 
context of the peace process, which was a key part of the package of institutional, welfare and 
tax120 reforms agreed for the province in cross-party talks in December 2014.121 
As for England, a Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill on powers in policy domains 
such as economic development, transport and social care in return for elected mayors in 
combined authority areas,122 a measure which, if in overly discretionary and patchwork 
fashion,123 grapples with the internal governance aspect of the dreaded ‘English question’.124 
At least it should help to constitutionalise a devolutionary process that, as shown in the trail-
blazing city region scheme for the ‘northern power-house’ of Greater Manchester,125 has 
hitherto been cobbled together in strikingly informal, closed and unaccountable fashion.126 
Not forgetting the victor’s touch of EVEL, though proposed changes to House of Commons 
standing orders, while offering a protectively domestic way forward, have immediately 
served to expose the practical difficulties of drafting and implementation.127  
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2. Northern lights 
But of course the May 2015 general election produced two winners: not just the Prime 
Minister with the blue Conservative sash, but also Nicola Sturgeon with the yellow SNP one. 
Who will best traverse the constitutional moment and who indeed will most whip things up? 
Alternatively, can David Cameron (and his successors) ride out the storm? And how intense 
for Wales and the rest of the UK will be the buffeting side-winds? Nor does it detract from 
the sense of crisis for the Union to point up the major element of gradualism in the SNP’s 
approach,128 not least post-referendum. ‘We believe in independence but that is not what this 
election is about’;129 as a form of political enticement directed to an end to austerity, and 
more particularly, in ranging beyond identity politics, to collapsing the unionist Scottish 
Labour Party like a house of cards, the language of their May 2015 manifesto was cleverly 
chosen.  
 
Let me refer to a recent report from UCL’s Constitution Unit, which usefully synthesises 
much in a public discussion apt to be weighed down in detail.130 A set of maps of possible 
constitutional ways forward is provided in which Scotland naturally features prominently. It 
is for these Celtic cousins the ever more familiar three models picture: devo more, by which 
is meant the substantial Smith package already in train; devo even more, for which read 
‘Smith-plus’ extras such as business taxes, employment law and further welfare powers; and 
devo max, the SNP-style iteration of, on the one hand, ‘full fiscal autonomy’, and on the 
other, a most basic Union core (monetary policy, foreign policy, defence and security, 
citizenship, value added tax).131 Underscoring the pace of events, perhaps it was inevitable 
that devo even more would be a topic of conversation between David Cameron and Nicola 
Sturgeon within days of the May 2015 election.132 With the Smith recommendations 
effectively banked, and the devolution of ‘Smith-plus powers’ made a priority in her Party’s 
manifesto,133 a buoyant Scottish First Minister could hardly ask for less. And, especially 
given the attenuated nature of the Smith process, the Prime Minister could scarcely forbear to 
hear her out.  
Self-evidently, the further one goes down the path of devo even more, the greater is the 
challenge to social citizenship in terms of the pooling and distributing of risks and 
resources.134 Even, however, with a different constellation of political forces, the 
constitutional conversation in this area is apt to be a continuing one. Successive generations 
of the welfare state teach that patterns of entitlement are not fixed in stone. A predictable 
source of disagreement between the members, in deliberating the division of welfare 
responsibilities the Smith Commission had effectively to navigate the ongoing replacement of 
means-tested benefits and tax credits at UK-level in terms of ‘Universal Credit’.135 Relevant 
provisions in the UK government’s draft legislative clauses for the Scotland Bill could not 
escape forensic examination by the Devolution (Further Powers) Committee at Holyrood.136 
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The legislative proceedings at Westminster will surely involve pressure on UK ministers to 
expand on the top-up welfare powers for the Scottish Parliament in the Bill as introduced.137 
Constitutional asymmetry magnified: suffice it to add that, from a Welsh perspective, there is 
a certain dream-like quality to this development in light of the differential funding levels. A 
cautious approach on the part of the Welsh government to the accretion of welfare powers, 
especially top-up ones, is thus readily envisaged, and not only for ideological reasons. Legal 
authority without the financial resources properly to fuel or animate it is not a good place to 
be in terms of constitutional and political responsibility. 
A somewhat elastic term, devo max was subtly repackaged in the SNP’s 2015 manifesto as 
‘full fiscal responsibility’.138 Yet this confederal-type approach could hardly escape a torrent 
of criticism concerning possible large-scale adverse effects on the public finances in 
Scotland, and hence for many citizens for whom good unionists should have a care, 
especially in the light of weakening oil revenues.139 Moreover, in constitutional terms, the 
policy represents a poison-pill for the Union. On the economic side, it raises an Athenian-
type question of why all we taxpayers would continue to bear the risks of currency and 
monetary policy if Union institutions lack effective control of fiscal policy in the member 
part. And, howsoever diluted in recent times, the social Union would appear but a hollow 
hope should its institutions be unable to proceed on the basis that poverty neither begins nor 
ends at the border by Gretna Green.  
3. Late dawn 
As regards the broad institutional framework, it is not difficult to identify a useful set of 
reforms in London: commonly, however, because they have a lengthy pedigree in the face of 
Whitehall/Westminster conservatism. Take for example one of the better ideas in Labour’s 
2015 election manifesto, a Senate of the Nations and Regions.140 This obviously is no magic 
anchor to secure the Union, though it might just help a little. But in constituting a set of 
voices from across the UK, it is, as against a House of Lords disproportionately composed 
from certain parts of England,141 one form of constitutional improvement.  
An old hobby-horse of mine142 is the unrealised potential with shared rule and self-rule of 
basic constitutional desiderata of joint consideration and comity or mutual respect. Although 
precepts of co-operation, communication and consultation were contained in the original ‘soft 
law’143 documentation on intergovernmental relations in the UK,144 the associated processes 
were predictably unstable and disjointed, discretionary and closed, and highly dependent on 
political and administrative goodwill. Indeed, at the birth of devolution to Scotland and 
Wales, I characterised the intergovernmental system centred on the Joint Ministerial 
Committee as a ‘black hole’ at the heart of the UK’s new constitutional architecture.145 
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Highlighting the potential for central domination, but also an important role for the system as 
part of the ‘glue’ of a reinvented Union, I made a series of recommendations such as statutory 
underpinning for the JMC, transparency as a guiding principle, and proper parliamentary 
scrutiny.146  
 
Nothing has happened to change my view. The Welsh government for example presents a 
decidedly mixed picture of shared rule as practiced by Whitehall departments and policy 
teams, namely ‘professional, business-like, constructive, numerous, complex and sometimes 
frustrating’ working relationships.147 Meanwhile, testimony to Whitehall inertia during a 
period of territorial political movement from cosy Labour hegemony to wrangling 
cohabitation and possible break-up,148 a series of recent reports from parliamentary 
committees and think-tanks rehearses complaints about fragmentation, too little democratic 
oversight, and, not least in the EU context, organisational skews in favour of London.149 
Today, an additional premium is placed on an efficient and effective system of 
intergovernmental relations in view of a (Smith-style) looser Union characterised by more 
exclusive territorial authority and much shared interest.150 Perhaps hopefully, a reference in 
the Queen’s Speech documentation to a revised Memorandum of Understanding on 
intergovernmental relations,151 and also a shake-up in the UK Cabinet Office featuring the 
development of a UK Governance Group,152 shows a new-found determination in Whitehall 
to address at least some of the concerns.  
 
What, it may be asked, of the full-formed ‘F’ word? The argument for an English Parliament 
will not go away and, on from a burgeoning debate about EVEL, may well grow louder. But 
Kilbrandon’s view that a federal system, strictly conceived, breaks down on the rock of 
England, has yet to be convincingly challenged. Again, if only with faint echoes of the late 
failure of Irish home rule,153 much of the enticing ambiguity of full-form federalism is lost 
amid the storm. On from Kilbrandon’s somewhat centralist language of preserving unity and 
desirable flexibility, this particular version of shared rule and self-rule is now increasingly 
presented as the last, best, hope for the Union. This is no idle point. Allow me to share a 
dynamic from a recent full-day seminar at Edinburgh University titled ‘how federal is 
Britain?’154 Conducted under the Chatham House rule, this brought together not only 
academics but also a swathe of officials and other influential actors from north of the border. 
Intellectual origins, comparative perspectives, even a few practical pointers, it all proceeded 
swimmingly until someone – I wonder who? – asked why the Scottish government would 
now be interested in discussing full-form federalism. Answer came there none. And this was 
even before the results of the May 2015 general election.  
Let us suppose that, somehow putting to one side the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, 
the UK government started down this path. The issue of a secession clause – where the 
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border-poll provisions for Northern Ireland155 provide a statutory precedent on which to build 
– would immediately be centre-stage. The very fact of the Scottish independence referendum 
reinforces a contemporary constitutional understanding that the UK is a voluntary association 
of nations, with each entitled to opt-out if it so wishes. In the light of statements about the 
September 2014 vote being a once in a generation opportunity,156 the debate in Scotland over 
when it would be reasonable to hold another independence referendum will no doubt 
continue. But turning the argument round, the UK government did not claim that September 
2014 was an opportunity for independence never to be repeated; and thankfully so, given the 
strength of the idea of popular sovereignty in Scottish political thought.157  
Rehearsing the need for a more rounded approach to the territorial constitution, one which 
incorporates a rich mix of centralist and devolutionary perspectives, the Bingham Centre 
recently proposed a statutory ‘Charter of the Union’.158 Mistakenly, in my view, their report 
immediately links this to the rambling question of a written constitution. More neutral 
language, a ‘Constitutional Renewal Act’ perhaps, might also be thought advisable, including 
from a unionist perspective in the spirit of keep calm and carry on. The Charter itself is 
presented as a vehicle for what are grandly called ‘principles of union constitutionalism’, 
which - ranging considerably beyond Kilbrandon’s old specification in terms of democracy 
and rule of law - extend to matters such as social solidarity and a common economic 
framework.159 If they were properly internalised, such principles could have a useful role to 
play in guiding legislative and executive processes at UK level. But I am not one for turning 
substantive principles of this kind into statutory principles of interpretation, hence further 
invading the domestic political space, as the Bingham Centre, pressing for more 
judicialisation, particularly advocates.160 Even of course if the constitutional slight of no 
designated Welsh seat on the UK Supreme Court is corrected.161  
Suppose however that UK ministers, proceeding on the basis that some statutory ‘principles 
of union constitutionalism’ are more attractive - viable - than others, were tempted to inject 
some such legal methodology. Analogous to the principle of ‘sincere cooperation’ familiar in 
the EU context, and previously locked in the official documentation of UK intergovernmental 
relations and waiting to escape,162 an overarching principle of comity, trust and fair dealing 
would be a suitable candidate. Legislative steers bringing a modicum of order to the 
devolution case law could usefully be added. Happily, the Bingham Centre has already done 
much of the heavy lifting with an excellent analysis distilling relevant principles from the 
jurisprudence; or, more accurately, selectively identifying them from the more liberal parts.163 
A system of government for the UK that is coherent, stable and workable; generous grants of 
devolved legislative authority; a quartet of parliaments and assemblies that enjoy plenary 
law-making powers: as principled guidance for determining issues of devolved authority, this 
is good to go.  
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4. Sat nav 
Looking forward, Conservative Party policies on an in/out EU referendum, and on replacing 
the much maligned Human Rights Act 1998 with a British Bill of Rights, loom large. A tale 
of two Unions and/or the next fork in the road, a constitutional choreography with the EU 
referendum can already be sketched. The SNP demands a ‘double lock’ - actually a quadruple 
one – whereby the UK remains a Member State unless each home country votes to leave.164 
The Conservatives duly insist that no, this is an archetypal UK issue. If, as just could possibly 
happen, the UK votes to separate but Scotland votes better together in the EU, the SNP 
demand another independence referendum, this time making the fair constitutional point of 
material change in circumstance from September 2014. Meanwhile, Wales looks on, possibly 
transfixed.  
As for human rights reform, the Conservatives’ original policy document talked somewhat 
darkly of working with the devolved institutions ‘as necessary’ in order to ensure an effective 
new settlement across the UK.165 We touch here on some highly convoluted issues of 
constitutional and international law, rendered more difficult by the absence of precise 
legislative proposals in the light of new-found ministerial interest in public consultation.166 
Matters are compounded by fundamental differences between the various devolutionary 
frameworks: the Good Friday Agreement stipulating incorporation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in Northern Ireland;167 the Scottish Parliament under their 
reserved powers model seemingly able to legislate on human rights but not to modify the 
Human Rights Act;168 and Cardiff Bay heavily constrained in key intersecting policy areas or 
by reason of the unified legal system of England and Wales. Tucking in behind Scottish 
institutions firmly committed to Convention rights, and making great play with the Sewel 
Convention, could well have major attractions for Welsh ministers and officials. Whitehall 
would do well, in a situation infused with territorial constitutional values, to be cautious. In 
the continuing struggle over the Union, some fights are better picked than others. A case like 
Asbestos Diseases cannot obscure the place of Convention rights as part of the young 
polities’ DNA.169  
 
CONCLUSION 
We are not yet at the end of the Union, nor are we in Churchillian terms at the end of the 
beginning. The question which faces us is rather whether this is the beginning of the end for 
the Union and no-one knows the answer to that. Self-evidently, however, the chances are 
much increased – as present day efforts at making the Union framework more robust serve in 
part to underline. Moods change, but at least for the time being ‘the wind is in the north’.  
Several things can be said with confidence. First, from the Welsh perspective, this small 
polity is still being all too often buffeted about. The price of devolution, the St David’s Day 
process reminds us, is eternal vigilance. The approach to reserved powers advertised in the 
Command Paper Powers for a Purpose is the type of arrant pedantry up with which Wales 
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should not put. Now that this is highlighted, the extent to which the approach is carried 
through into the upcoming Wales Bill will be a key litmus test of constitutional sensibility on 
the part of the new UK Conservative government.  
Secondly, the failure to heed our Welsh soothsayers and take seriously the need for a widely 
informed and rounded approach to the UK’s territorial constitution ahead of the Scottish 
independence referendum is a serious blot on the record of the Cameron-Clegg coalition 
government. The car crash that was Kilbrandon warns against any easy assumption that a 
more stable and coherent system of governance would have resulted, not least for England. 
But from a unionist perspective just about anything would have been preferable to the storm-
force conditions of the ‘vow’. Thirdly, if the Union is to make good a reprieve in the Scottish 
independence referendum, this will require political skills and statesmanship of a very high 
order. There is no quick fix, and in this particular multinational democracy that includes full-
form federalism. Fourthly, a case of playing institutional catch-up, the continuing need to 
reconfigure key modalities of shared rule as well as self-rule in the Union will be of the 
essence of territorial constitutional reform in the next period. The chimera of heavy doses of 
law calming the storm should not obscure this major opportunity for constitutional 
improvement.  
Lastly, the need for principles of mutual benefit, comity and parity of esteem to inform 
constructive and flexible federal-type responses at UK level inside a famously uncodified 
constitution deserves special emphasis. Without joined-up constitutional thinking at 
Westminster along these lines, and associated changes in the workings of the post-imperial 
Whitehall machine, the next period of our constitutional futures in this cluttered isle is even 
more likely to prove tempestuous. 
 
 
